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TOWARDS AN INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY SAFE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOL
PEDRO FORTUNY AYUSO
Abstract. We introduce what –if some kind of group action exists–
is a truly (information-theoretically) safe cryptographic communication
system: a protocol which provides zero information to any passive ad-
versary having full access to the channel.
1. The false algorithm, simple version
Assume Alice wants to share a secret s, which we assume for simplicity1
is a non-zero rational number s = p/q ∈ Q⋆. For example, s could be the
key of a symmetric key protocol, a password or even a complete message
such as a pair of coordinates in a map or a time.
Alice picks another random rational t and calls v = (s, t) to the corre-
sponding point in Q2.
She chooses a random transformation A ∈ GL2(Q) in the linear group of
Q2 and computes v1 = v ·A. Alice sends v1 to Bob.
Bob picks another random transformation B ∈ GL2(Q) and computes
v2 = v1 ·B, and sends v2 back to Alice. Notice that v1 gives no information
to Bob or an eavesdropper (Eve) about s, because t is random and v1 can
be any point in Q2, depending on t and A, which are both unknown to both
Bob and Eve. For a similar reason, the knowledge of v1 and v2 gives no
useful information about B.
Alice now computes v3 = v2 · A
−1 and sends v3 back to Bob. Again, the
knowledge of v1, v2 and v3 is useless in order to retrieve the original v.
Finally, Bob computes v4 = v3 · B
−1.
If only v4 = v...!
2. The protocol “would be” safe
Let us assume the above algorithm ends up with v4 = v and let us prove
its safeness under this condition.
Theorem 1. The above method of communication is information-theoretically
safe, assuming v, A and B (and their inverses, obviously) are kept secret.
That is, the knowledge of the whole communication gives no information on
the message.
Proof. We only need to show that an eavesdropper which knows all the
communication has no clue about what s may be. In other words, it is
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1This assumption might be relaxed, using an infinite set is for exposition reasons, see
section 3.
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enough to show that for any rational s′, there exist another rational number
t′ and matrices A′, B′ such that the communication between Alice and Bob
is the same (i.e. v1, v2 and v3). But this is trivial. 
Remark: The algorithm described above obviously does not work be-
cause GL2(Q) is non-commutative (in general, the linear group is noncom-
mutative for dimension greater than 1).
3. What is needed?
A natural question comes to mind: what are the necessary conditions for
a group action on a set for the above algorithm to provide a valid system?
What we used above is:
(1) A set S (either finite or infinite) (the rational plane in the example).
(2) An action G×S2 → S2 of a commutative group G on S2 (the group of
movements of the plane in the example, which is not commutative).
This condition means that after the above protocol is carried out
completely, one always gets the original message.
(3) Conditions on the action. At least the following ones, but more
might be needed:
• Given (s, t) ∈ S2 and g ∈ G, for any s′ ∈ S there are t′ ∈ S and
g′ ∈ G such that g · (s, t) = g′ · (s′, t′).
• For any (s, t)inS2 and A,B ∈ G, there are (s′, t′) and A′, B′ ∈ G
for which the sequences in the above algorithm are the same:
[(s, t)·A, (s, t) ·A ·B, (s, t) ·A ·B ·A−1] =
[(s′, t′) · A′, (s′, t′) ·A′ ·B′, (s′, t′) ·A′ · B′ · (A′)−1].
In fact, we do not need exactly an action of G on S2.
Definition 1. Let G be a (not necessarily commutative) group acting on a
set T . We say that t ∈ T is comm-fixed if g · t = t for any g ∈ Comm(G)
(the commutator of G). A subset S ⊂ T is comm-fixed if any s ∈ S is
comm-fixed.
It is clear that a subset S ⊂ T is comm-fixed if and only if, for any s ∈ S
and any g, h ∈ G, one has s = h−1g−1hgs˙. From this, it follows that we
do not need exactly an action of a commutative group on S2 but an action
of a (not necessarily commutative) group on a set X ⊃ S2 for which S2 is
comm-fixed and which satisfies, at least, condition (3) above.
We would like to prove two results; the first one seems relatively easy,
while we have no clue (but are somewhat pessimistic) about the second one:
Conjecture 1. With the above conditions on X, S2 and G, the protocol
described in section 1 is information-theoretically safe.
Question 1. Do there exist X,S and a group G acting on X for which
S2 ⊂ X is comm-fixed and such that the stated conditions hold?
Remark: it is obvious that S2 can be changed by any set of the same
cardinal.
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